There is a widespread belief that the quality of one’s planning improves in direct proportion to its detail. That is, the more factors and variables that are taken into the account, the more robust (and successful) the final product will be.
In fact, the opposite is often the case in practice. Plans have to function in a very hostile environment, and it is simply not possible to take every single factor into account when making a plan. To give a rather extreme example, there have been times when the volcanoes in Iceland erupt and create ash clouds that completely disrupt air traffic over the Atlantic. Similar events happen in other active volcano zones. One can’t really plan for such things so much as be aware that anything can happen.
Similarly, countless battles (and even wars) have turned on a single individual seeing an unforeseen opportunity – and taking it. Good planners try to create these opportunities and provide flexibility to exploit unforeseen good fortune. They also try to create some depth so that the schedule has some “give” in it.
Operation Market-Garden is the classic example of plan that had such a rigid and detailed timetable that it was almost impossible to achieve. No one factor defeated the Allied attack into the Netherlands in 1944, but each minor setback created what amounted to a cascade failure.
The D-Day landings months earlier present an interesting contrast. While the initial landings were not as successful as hoped, the Allies were able to build a secure bridgehead onto the Continent. In the weeks that followed, fighting in the dense bocage country chewed up resources and time, but in late July, Operation Cobra achieved a breakout that wildly exceeded expectations.
Indeed, the rapidity of the German collapse greatly contributed to the disaster of Operation Market-Garden because the planners assumed that they were facing a defeated foe, allowing their intricate plan to succeed and end the war.
This ties into my (somewhat dormant at the moment) discussion of China’s potential invasion of Taiwan. With decades to time, one would expect fairly complete plans, which are regularly updated.
However, that also can lead to complacency, since the obvious assumption is that the heavy lifting has already been done, and all that is left is to tweak the details. Any attempt to rock the boat and challenge those assumptions could end one’s career.
Similarly, writing a plan with the flexibility for improvisation simply does not work in peacetime Communist militaries. It is true that the pressure and needs of war can loosen command arrangements, but the vary nature of the operation precludes that from happening. The Soviets paid a heavy price in blood and land before they could achieve more operational flexibility. China will not have that much time.
An interesting contrast in terms of operational planning involving many of the same people can be found in the US Civil War in the career of Ulysses S. Grant. When he rose to high command in the Western theater, he had the authority to organize his troops as he saw fit, and had a fair degree of discretion in terms of who did what. This made his armies very agile, and because he trusted his subordinates (who were outstanding leaders), he was very successful. William T. Sherman succeeded to his command and used the same system to outmaneuver and ultimately destroy the Southern armies in his area.
However, when Grant went east to take command of the Army of the Potomac, things did not go as smoothly. While much is said about Robert E. Lee’s generalship, the poor quality of leadership that Grant had to put up with was also a major factor. The Army of the Potomac was a very political army in a very political area, and it took several (very avoidable) disasters for Grant to finally flush out the incompetents and find capable subordinates.
The modern PLA is very much in the mold of the Army of the Potomac, where who you know mattered much more what what you know. Good plans can only get you so far, and ultimately it comes down to that most complex factor of all: excution.
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