This is the seventh part of a series of posts where I examine what would happen if the PRC invaded Taiwan. For deep background, check out my book on Chinese military history, Walls of Men.
Over the previous installments, I’ve outlined the many difficulties facing the People’s Liberation Army in terms of getting troops across the Taiwan Strait and establishing a beachhead on Taiwan itself. The are numerous pundits who assume that with sufficient sealift and massive air support, a lodgment is inevitable. That begs the question, however, because getting troops ashore isn’t the problem, it is supporting them and sustaining a buildup capable of overcoming all resistance. That is a much heavier lift.
Beachhead To Buildup
In the modern era, landings typically move through certain phases. First comes the landing itself, where troops slog ashore. It is imperative that they push as far inland as possible to gain greater strategic depth and also to have the room to start building up supply dumps beyond the range of enemy artillery.
It is actually after troops are ashore in quantity that the situation is at its most dangerous for the invader. The defender will immediately be moving to seal off the beachhead and then attack it, and heavy fighting will quickly deplete the supplies the invaders brought with them.
In every instance, one sees the same pattern: initial fighting, then pushing inland, both widening and deepening the bridgehead so that supplies and reinforcements can arrive. This is often a race against time as the attacker has to land troops and supplies faster than the defender can move up reinforcements. If that fails to happen, the operation has failed, and the entire force is at risk of destruction and/or capture.
This is exactly what happened at Dieppe on August 19, 1942. On that date, 6,000 troops (mostly Canadian) landed at the English Channel port and attempted to destroy the defenses, seize the harbor, and collect intelligence on German defenses and technology. The assault was a disaster, in large part because one of the key assumptions was that the harbor would quickly fall and then could be used to both unload reinforcements and later re-embark the raiders. When the harbor did not fall, may troops were unable to safely retreat and since no provision had been made to reembark troops and tanks from the beaches, more than half of the assault force was killed, wounded and/or captured.
This experience was crucial to later Allied successes in amphibious warfare, and mere months later, the landings in North Africa were much more successful.
To put it another way, the Allies used 6,000 troops to test their skill and validate their methods. China is staking everything on their first attempt.
Sustainment After The Assault
Most stories and movies about invasions focus on the initial landing, which makes great drama and is certainly more exciting than watching barges anchor and unload supplies. Yet that is the most important part of the operation, and as World War II ground on, it took on great significance. The same will be true in the Taiwan Strait. China will not simply vomit an army up out of the sea, it will have to unload it bit by bit. To do this will require uncontested control of the sea and the airspace above it, and it will also deprive the People’s Liberation Army Navy of a navy’s greatest asset: mobility. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was a Japanese attempt to capitalize on this weakness by trying to draw the main American strike forces away from the beachhead, allowing a powerful Japanese surface fleet to destroy the supply ships and leave the invading troops without ammunition, food or medicine. It almost worked.
There are lots of photos and hype over how China has prefabricated piers and floating docks, but they will have to survive not just enemy activity but potentially catastrophic typhoons. As soon as the first PLA soldier’s boot touches dry ground, it will be a race against time to keep the combat troops supplied and get reinforcements in place to defend the beachhead.
During this period, the landing force will be vulnerable to surface-to-surface missiles as well as long-range tube artillery. The task of the PLAN will be immense – providing naval fire support for the invading troops, protecting transports filled with reinforcements and supplies, and defending itself from attack from air, sea and land. It will be pinned in position, vulnerable to long range missiles as well as mines driving with the ocean current. Instead of maneuvering in the vastness of the Pacific, the PLAN’s carriers may as well by tied up in port. Forces allied to Taiwan, by contrast, will have total freedom of action, being able to move into range, launch sorties and then retire to rearm and refuel the next wave.
The Falkland Islands conflict in 1982 clearly illustrated the problems that arise in trying to conduct a naval invasion within range of enemy land-based air power. The British ultimately succeeded in their objective, but not without losing several warships, and it was a very close-run thing. The British also had several advantages in terms of more room to maneuver, and much greater ISR regarding the combat area than Argentina. The sinking of the General Belgrano caused Argentinian warships to stay in port, which will not be the case around Taiwan. The safest place for their subs and patrols will be the open sea.
It should also be noted that the British took their heaviest losses during the invasion and the subsequent effort to sustain it. Had the Argentinian garrison put up more prolonged resistance, this attrition might have been decisive.
A Question of Scale
The Falkland conflict was waged by relatively tiny forces with the British surface combatants consisting of 2 aircraft carriers, 8 destroyers and 16 frigates plus many more supporting vessels. The invasion itself pitted 13,000 British troops facing 9,000 Argentinians.
Now contrast this with the American invasion of Okinawa in the spring of 1945. The size of the American fleet was staggering: 7 fleet aircraft carriers, 6 light carriers, 12 escort carriers, 18 battleships, 31 heavy and light cruisers and 132 destroyers plus additional Allied warships, hundreds of aircraft and half a million troops.
This mammoth force was hurled against around 75,000 Japanese troops and perhaps 40,000 local conscripts who were cut off from resupply. With all of these resources, the result invasion was certainly a foregone conclusion, but it still took 82 days to subdue the island. During that time the Allies sustained 80,000+ casualties with considerable losses among ships and aircraft. It was a bloodbath.
Taiwan is 29 times larger than Okinawa and has been fortifying it for three generations. Taiwan also has 230,000 active duty personnel and 1.6 million reservists. Just getting a few thousand troops ashore will not be enough to secure victory.
About That Equipment
In my previous post, I asked if any of China’s equipment would stand up to actual battlefield conditions and example of Okinawa provides a useful contrast. By the spring of 1945, American troops were seasoned veterans in island fighting, and had total confidence in their battle-tested weapons. In addition, the tactical lessons learned from previous fighting had resulted in field modifications and upgrades specifically tailored to Japan’s fighting style. Though tanks with railroad ties piled around the hull may look strange to us, they were a response to the Japanese use of magnetic contact mines. Much provision was made for flamethrower vehicles as well, and American doctrine stressed force protection above all else.
The PLA has none of this information, and like many totalitarian states, their exercises appear tightly scripted to protect the reputations of the commanders involved. The constant purges and threats of purges have created a risk-averse environment where challenging tactical situations would be avoided. Put simply, there is nothing to be gained from identifying serious weaknesses and much to be lost.
Similarly, peacetime militaries rarely run vehicles until they break, but in combat that is often unavoidable. Many weapons look good in training or at the practice range but are found lacking when put to the test. This is one reason why civilian firearms experts have limited utility in gauging the true effectiveness of weapons. Taking a pristine weapon out of storage, putting a few hundred rounds through it at a range, or even a field exercise, and then going back to the barracks and cleaning it is not the same of carrying it in mud and rain while sleeping in a ditch.
Perhaps the most extreme example of this was the failure of the British L85A1 rifles in Operation Desert Storm. These were the primary infantry weapon and while they functioned well in Europe, the were a disaster in a hot, desert environment. Indeed, the entire stock of rifles had to go through an expensive refurbishment program after the conflict.
Thus, in addition to all the other problem confronting them, the PLA leadership will have to contend with the great unknown of how their equipment stands up to sustained use without maintenance.
To be fair, Taiwan also lacks combat experience, but much of their gear is either American or based on designs that have seen active service. Taiwan also benefits from American expertise and experience. Moreover, Taiwan will be on the defensive. The PLA carries the heavy burden of attack.
Casualties and Fighting Spirit
Thanks to the One Child policy, China’s troops are mostly without siblings. They are unlikely to have the same fatalistic tolerance for losses that characterized historic Chinese military operations. In those wars, conscripts were chosen by family to ensure that the bloodline would survive and the ancestors would be given their due. With four grandparents depending on a single son to sustain the family line and also support them in old age, what will happen when casualty notifications begin to arrive?
Taiwan (and indeed much of Asia) has a low birthrate, but this was the result of choices across society, not government decree. More importantly, it is not evenly distributed, so there are still large families to draw upon. Taiwan is also on the defensive and fighting for its survival. It’s troops will be defending their homes and families. The PLA soldiers are the ones that have to wade ashore in the face of withering defensive fire. Will “Xi Jinping Thought” be inspiring enough for them to brave that storm of steel?
Again, the landing is merely the first stage. Once the troops are in contact, losses will pile up and keep coming until one side calls it quits. The PLA’s active duty strength is roughly equivalent of Taiwan’s mobilized manpower, so in order to obtain the required superiority it is likely that reservists will have to be mobilized as well. What is their effectiveness? Youtubers in China have shown reserve call-ups, so there is some training, but is it just more marching or does it have some more practical purpose? This is just one of the many questions we cannot answer until the clash of arms takes place.
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