This is the fourth part of a series of posts where I examine what would happen if the PRC invaded Taiwan. For deep background, check out my book on Chinese military history, Walls of Men.
It may seem strange to wait until the fourth installment of a series on a potential military operation before dealing with the actual terrain, but this is not supposed to be a cohesive, finished document. I’m writing stuff as it occurs to me, and also as I see things that catch my interest.
Right now I’m seeing a lot of videos about how China is getting absolutely pounded by storms. Multiple typhoons have hit the mainland and more appear on the way. This is a necessary reminder that historical analogies only get one so far because local conditions can vary greatly. Crossing the English Channel is very different from crossing the Taiwan Strait.
The Lay of the Land
Let’s start with the geography. The Taiwan Strait is 81 miles wide at its narrowest point, and fleets attempting an invasion would have to go even farther. Like the Atlantic, the Pacific Ocean is prone to powerful cyclonic storms, and with a much larger expanse of warm water to draw energy from, typhoons can be incredibly powerful and destructive. Typhoon season is not to be trifled with (just ask the Mongols!) but even “normal” storms would make a landing very difficult.
Taiwan is located about midway opposite the Chinese coast, between the major ports of Shanghai (and the mouth of the Yangtze River) and Guangdong (which used to be call Canton) as well as Hong Kong and Macau. Unlike in Korea or Vietnam, which are on the periphery of the mainland, the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait would have a major impact on China’s core trade routes. Add in the likely involvement of Japan and the Philippines, and it’s basically a total maritime blockade.
China has lately been hit by severe storms and has widespread flooding. With roads and railways being washed out, this adds an additional layer of complexity to the equation. As mentioned in Part I, the concentration of forces in preparation for invasion (“mobilization”) will be impossible to conceal, doubly so if it requires major repair projects before the troop trains can even move.
A Land War At Sea
China is not a maritime nation. In fact, at one point the Empire responded to rampant coastal piracy by simply evacuating the coast! Rather than rely on ocean-going trade, China’s emperors constructed a network of canals to link the various river systems well away from the open sea. Under the Ming Dynasty, China briefly built a blue water fleet and explored as far away as Africa, but the endeavor was abandoned in the face of frontier troubles.
In fact, China’s threats greatest threats are usually internal ones, with the dynastic cycle being essentially a series of rebellions rather than invasions. China has also been expansionist, but until recently, this was continental, not maritime expansion. One can argue that the People’s Republic turning to the sea is because overland territorial expansion is no longer possible.
What that means is that China is having to learn open water operations from scratch. The Soviets provided a great deal of technical training, and after the Chinese Civil War, several Nationalist naval officers (who had American training) defected, but there was still not much of a knowledge base to draw upon. The American-trained officers were studying basic seamanship and the handling of small craft, not fleet operations. The Soviets built a considerable navy, but it could never rival the combined fleets of NATO and the United States. The Soviets regarded sea power as forward defense rather than force projection and China does the same.
It is also significant that China continues to take a land-based approach through the creation of islands in the South China Sea. These are supposed to provide force projection, but they are basically static targets. Unlike carrier groups, the targeting data for these islands is well known and they can be struck from halfway around the world.
While much is made of “ship-killer” hypersonic missiles, their targets are in continuous motion, and targeting data via satellite would almost certainly be disabled, requiring the use of aircraft, which in turn would be subject to limitations of fuel and are prone to detection. American carriers would be hard targets to find, let along hit, but those islands would be sitting ducks. Like the Great Wall, it is a positional defense that beats nothing, but cannot compete with strategic mobility, as the Mongols and Manchus proved.
Performative Fleet Operations
The PLAN currently fields three aircraft carriers. The Liaoning started as the Soviet Varyag, was sold to the PRC by Ukraine and subsequently refitted. The Liaoning was then used as a template for the Shandong. Both are “ski-jump” carriers that have limited aircraft selection since they have short take-off distances, though they can use arrestor gear upon landing.
The Fujian is the first fully indigenous design, designed to compete with US fleet carriers, but it still uses fuel and apparently its magnetically-driven catapults require enormous power generation, limiting overall range. There is also some question regarding its flight deck layout, which limits the sortie rate.
Put simply, China’s carriers are vastly outclassed by their American opponents, and while much is made of American strategic needs elsewhere, which limits the amount of force available against China, the PLAN also has hard limits in terms of maintenance. The Americans also have maintenance cycles, but they have both much more depth and much more experience in how to accelerate them.
A Reverse Falklands Situation
In 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, provoking a clash with Great Britain. The subsequent conflict has been exhaustively studied, and while the weapons have evolved since then, there are several key elements that are relevant to our scenario.
For one thing, the British were limited to carriers vary much like the Lioaning and the Shandong – “ski jump” carriers using aircraft optimized for short take-offs rather than speed or long range. The Harrier “jump jets” gave a good account of themselves in part because of their excellent training and American-supplied air-to-air missiles.
The British were up against superior numbers of land-based aircraft, which also had several advantages over the slower Harriers, but these were offset by the cautious Argentine leadership and less skilled pilots.
The situation with Taiwan is similar, but also very different. China’s carriers would have the benefit of land-based aircover, but it is an open question of how closely Chinese service components can coordinate. Assuming seamless cooperation (a big assumption if there ever was one), American and Taiwanese aircraft, minelayers and submarines would put the PLAN to its harshest test.
American sailors have recently demonstrated their combat prowess, both above and below the waves. All China has done is choreographed fleet maneuvers, with far less ambitious flight operations.
It is worth noting that in 1982, Argentina also had an aircraft carrier, and kept it safely in port after the General Belgrano was torpedoed. One wonders if China will heed that wisdom.
Between the distance, the weather and the lack of operational experience, China has multiple paths to disaster, and the path to success is unclear.
Chateau Lloyd 
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