This is the second part of a series of posts where I examine what would happen if the PRC invaded Taiwan. For deep background, check out my book on Chinese military history, Walls of Men.
Perhaps the greatest unknown variable in looking at an invasion of Taiwan by Communist China is the performance of the Peoples Liberation Army. How capable is it? It is almost impossible to say, especially since so little is known about it’s practices and training. In this installment we will examine the factors that will determine its performance as well as the many challenges it must confront before the first boot reaches Taiwan’s shores.
A Political Army
Communist China uses an unusual organization for their national defense establishment. Instead of having a department or ministry charged with directing the various armed services, the PLA is in charge of all of it. Each branch is a derivative of the PLA, which is why they have odd-sounding names, like the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) or the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and so on.
Another unique feature of the Peoples Republic of China is that the PLA does not serve the nation or the state, but is instead an arm of the Chinese Communist Party. That in turn means in order to move up in rank, one must be a Party member, and loss of that membership results in losing one’s position in the PLA. To put it another way, the PLA is explicitly a political organization, so operational decisions have to be made in line with Party ideology.
It also means that loyalty to the CCP (and especially the dominant faction in power) is more important than competence. Like the old Soviet Red Army, the PLA also uses commissars to ensure political reliability on the unit level, which adds another level of complexity to the decision-making process. The obvious result is that there is an inherent bias against risk-taking or sharing unpleasant truths because these can be career ending events. China has a long tradition of trying to hide problems instead of solving them, and Communism simply makes this even more pronounced.
The upshot is that it is very difficult to get an honest picture of the PLA because so much effort is make to keep up appearances.
The Warrior Problem
China has never had a warrior culture. This may seem surprising given the enduring importance of Sun Tzu in military strategy or the lengthy history of wars and conquests in China (which of course I cover in my book), but the fact is that the Han Chinese have always seen soldiers as means to an end rather than a respectable profession. In the old Confucian hierarchy, soldiers don’t even have a place, being essentially regarded as bandits with uniforms.
This stands in sharp contrast with many other cultures that valorize martial prowess and accord high status to warriors. Europe’s aristocracy has its origins in feudal chieftains and for centuries warfare served as a reliable path to advance is social status (assuming of course, that you survived it). Military service was until recently far more honorable than engaging in commerce.
China was very different. While even a humble peasant could take control of the Empire in times of strife, his descendants almost immediately embraced the status and decadence of the Imperial court rather than continue to campaign. It is in fact a rare thing for a Chinese emperor to lead armies in person.
Several dynasties attempted to create something like a warrior caste, but these always failed. One of the reasons the Qing Dynasty (which was overthrown in 1911) was so successful and lasted so long was that it was ruled by Manchurian nomads who had a strong warrior ethos and they worked hard to prevent their people from assimilating with the Han Chinese.
Seven decades of Communist Party rule has destroyed a great many of China’s traditional cultural practices, but the aversion to military service remains. This is why China still uses conscription to fill out the ranks of its army and armed police forces. Some Western sources downplay this (strategypage.com has erroneously claimed that the PLA is all-volunteer), but military service only appeals to a very narrow segment of the population: the descendants of the PLA’s founding commanders.
These “princes” are well connected within the CCP, and for them the path to power runs not through the bureaucracy but through the military ranks. Just as with Party officials, networking is critical and there are very much cliques between the various commands and branches of the service.
The rank and file are below all of this, and while military service can be the ticket to education or career training in the United States, it is far less lucrative in China. Senior veterans receive little in the way of retirement pay.
The One Child Policy
Despite an aversion to military service, Chinese troops have fought hard throughout history, often making fanatical last stands or charging forward heedless of losses. Even now there is a certain fatalism in Chinese culture that causes people not to look before the cross the street. In battle, the same sense of resignation applies.
However, with the advent of the One Child Policy, things have changed. Historically the Chinese had large families and conscription was in fact done by family rather than individuals. Perhaps the most accessible example of this for Western audiences is the Disney film Mulan, where the title character disguises herself as a man to spare her injured father from the rigors of military life when the family receives its draft notice. Regular families would have had sons to spare, and they would serve knowing that their family line would continue. The great fear in traditional China was not that an individual might die, but that the family itself would become extinct, leaving no one to care for their ancestors.
The One Child Policy successfully crushed the birth rate (with disastrous consequences) and so China now has a military that is largely made of men without siblings. If they die, no one will care for their parents in old age, to say nothing of honoring the spirits of their ancestors.
With this added pressure to survive, it is an open question as to how hard the Chinese will fight. This extends beyond troops hesitating at the point of danger. As casualties mount, the grieving families – who now have nothing left to live for – might well create civil disorder. China currently has a big problem with “revenge against society” attacks, and there isn’t really a precent for what happens when an army made up of only children goes to war.
An Ideology of Theft
The founding generation of the PLA was committed to radical change, fired up with revolutionary fervor and willing to die for the cause of unifying China and restoring its greatness. As with the Soviet Union and other utopian movements, the fires that once inspired the people have long since been extinguished. The CCP is simply a totalitarian state with Marxist slogans built around the most rapacious form of capitalism in human history.
There remain certain elements of traditional belief (particularly in the countryside), but for the most part the idea of individual morality was destroyed by the twin cataclysms of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. It has been replaced by total fixation on gaining power, status or resources regardless of the cost. There is no obligation to society as a whole; loyalty belongs solely to the immediate family and perhaps the village. Theft is rampant, and self-dealing is the default practice. “If you can cheat, cheat” seems to be the national motto, and there are endless stories of shoddy construction projects, poisoned food, counterfeit medicine and other outrages that shock the Western conscience but are merely part of the (heavily polluted) air the mainland Chinese breathe.
What does this mean in the context of military service? There is a belief by some (almost always civilians) that military culture can transform individuals into automatons who are able to hold their immoral impulses in check through a brutally strict system of discipline. This is true to a point. Historically, armies were often composed of the scum of the earth, convicts or conscripts selected from men who otherwise provided no economic or societal benefit. Indeed, until the advent of mass conscription, most Western armies were built on this foundation, and while strict discipline held the troops in check in the barracks and on the battlefield, once they entered enemy territory, they could be trusted to rape and pillage on the same level as common brigands.
Despite its Marxist trappings, China is a highly stratified society, with the Communist Party replacing the old scholar-administrators. The children of this class – the best and the brightest – do not join the PLA. Yes, as noted above, there is a subclass of the descendants of the founding generals who continue to serve, but the mentality is more like an organized crime syndicate than the Western tradition of military families that can proudly point to ancestors fighting in various wars over the centuries. The networks naturally aid career advancement (such social cliques exist in all militaries), but corruption is also a key motivator.
The various cliques that make up the officer corps look after their own, and careers are more likely to end due to falling from favor than incompetence or even corruption. Indeed, corruption trials are now the standard way to deal with politically suspect officers since all of them are guilty of it.
How deep the corruption goes is uncertain. There are reports that two sets of equipment are produced for the PLA: a superior “inspection-ready” version and a cheaper one that is issued to the actual troops. Because of the Communist Party’s total control, soldier who dare to complain about poor equipment or food risk severe punishment for speaking out. The parade units look great, the slick video edits of troops, ships and aircraft are impressive, but no one knows how these units will actually perform on active service.
The Experience Deficit
The last major operations of the PLA took place more than four decades ago, and it did not go well. The invasion of Vietnam was a debacle, and while hard lessons were learned and performance improved, those responsible for that transformation have long since retired. Two generations of recruits have passed through the service since then, and dimly-remembered engagements using 1970s weapons systems have little relevance today.
Training and exercises likewise have their limits. Exercises are often scripted and in the Communist system are more often used to glorify the military rather than identify deficiencies.
While one might be able to gauge the more technical branches of the service through routine training (and publicly observable mishaps), Army forces really have to be in action to know what they are worth.
Knowing what we know, the likelihood that the PLA will prove combat capable and highly effective seems very low. Of course, there is a lot we do not know, but I doubt it is sufficient to overcome the many difficulties China faces on the personnel front.
Chateau Lloyd 
Leave a comment