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This is part of a series of posts where I examine factors and scenarios for the PRC to invade Taiwan.

The first thing we have to consider is what kind of time will China need to prepare and how much warning will Taiwan (and other interested parties) have.  There is a recurring notion that the PLA is straining at the leash, perpetually on standby and is merely awaiting the signal to strike.  This is false, and this essay will look at how much effort – and time – it would take for China to even be ready to strike.

Logistics Matter

This importance of logistics is going to be a recurring theme both in this post and in ones to come.  Yes, there’s the old line about amateurs talking strategy and tactics while professionals talk about logistics, but it’s true.  As a “certified war planner” I can speak from experience that operational and strategic planning are almost entirely concerned with logistics.  It’s not always obvious when it works, but when it fails, it’s a very big deal.  Indeed, when it’s done right (as it usually is in the American armed forces), people seem to think that movements are really just a matter of deciding where to go and going there.

Another reason why logistics are overlooked even my military history nerds is that it’s not very exciting.  People want to focus on Pickett’s Charge or Napoleon sending the Old Guard in at Waterloo, not the wagon trains that enabled both campaigns.  In a lot of wargames, these elements are heavily abstracted precisely because they distract from the “fun” of maneuver and combat.  On the tactical level, they typically don’t matter much as it’s assumed the people involved brought enough arrows, swords or bullets to get the job done.  I have seen a few games (Avalon Hill’s Little Round Top comes to mind) where there are rules about running out of ammunition, but that’s not always applicable.

As we scale up into larger formations, there is usually a nod to logistics by requiring a road or rail line to be clear (assuming these are on a map) or that one can draw a line to some rear area supply source free of enemy units.

But on the whole, it’s boring and one of the easy ways to work it into a game is to limit a player’s actions based on it.  Columbia Games did probably the best job of it with their “block games” that require players to buy headquarters points which allow units to move.  Whether playing the American Civil War or World War II scenarios, there is never enough of these points, which is very important for our discussion.  Commanders in the real world operate under constraint that are often invisible to outside observers.

This is partly because most books on military history brush past it as well.  Your average aircraft, vehicle, or uniform book gives little if any space to wagons and trucks.  I’ve got several books on military aircraft and most of them ignore tankers and cargo carriers.  They’re just not as sexy as the fighters and the bombers, but we’re going to talk a great deal about them.

What Does “Mobilization” Mean?

There is a notion among civilians that armies and navies just sit around waiting to go to war.  They get the order and they move.  Again, this is usually because most accounts of battles – whether in movies or books – start when the battle is about to be joined.  Maybe there will be a sentence or two saying referencing things being made ready, but the actual movements are literally as exciting as a railroad schedule.

In reality, peacetime militaries keep themselves quite busy.  If they aren’t training, they are cleaning or repairing stuff.  Some of them get sick and need rest.  Others go on leave.  Whether in ancient Rome or present day America, thereis a clear difference between being “in garrison” and “on campaign,” and signs of the transition from one to the other are hard to conceal.

“Mobilization” is the process by which troops in garrison are prepared to move – they literally become mobile.  This also refers to reservists being called back into service and preparing those units to move as well.   Decades of low-intensity wars have gotten the American public used to National Guard and Reserve troops being activated and sent overseas, but historically this was an all-or-nothing event, a precursor to war.  Mobilizing the troops was a sure sign that war was coming, and since no one wanted to be caught with their troops in garrison (or their ships half-manned in port), one nation mobilizing could initiation an escalation spiral, and World War I is perhaps the classic example of this.

What this means is that if China decides to undertake a major military operation, the signs would be impossible to conceal.  Let’s examine some of them.

Activating the Reserves

As mentioned above, “calling out the National Guard” used to be something of a big deal in the United States, but starting in the 1990s, “peacetime activations” became more common and that is why US reserve components are some of the best in the world.  It is far more common for reserve components to assemble a few times a year for refresher training, maybe conduct an exercise, but save calling them up for a serious emergency, with the assumption that even after they are assembled, they will still need time to get back into shape and used to full-time duty.  

When the reserves are activated, this can create a serious disruption to the economy and society as a whole.  Again, Americans have come to take this in stride, but callups are still very stressful for families and employers of reservists and the US is also unique in creating special benefits and legal protections for activated reservists.  This is because American society uniquely places high status on military service to the point that someone with a veteran hat or apparel will likely be thanked many times by complete strangers.  This is unknown most everywhere else, but especially in China, where military service has historically been looked down upon.  (That is a topic that I will address in depth later.)

From time to time, China has conducted small mobilizations, and they draw immediate attention.  For an invasion of Taiwan, pretty much all of their reserve components will be needed, and they will be seen moving through train stations, boarding busses, and so on.  

Causing that level of disruption – and having to pay and feed part-time troops on a full-time basis – is not something done lightly, even in a Communist dictatorship.  The bigger the mobilization, the more likely it is for real.

Indeed, during the Cold War there were incidents where practice mobilizations were thought to be a precursor for war, which is why tensions rose whenever they happened.  For example, in 1983 NATO held Exercise Able Archer and it was so realistic that the Soviets feared that war was imminent.  

The point is that while nations can threaten and posture and their leaders can talk tough, mobilizing one’s forces is one of those steps that conveys absolute sincerity in one’s intentions.

Dual-Use Assets

In recent years there has been a fair amount of talk in the defense community about China’s extensive merchant fleet being built with military conversions in mind.  With only a few changes, they can mount modular missile batteries and/or accept tanks and other armored vehicles as cargo.  The United States possess similar auxiliary vessels, but because China is such a ship-building colossus, its resources are much bigger.  

Similarly, China also has a large civil aviation fleet that could be quickly converted into troop and cargo transports.  These are often cited as proof of China’s capability to launch an invasion of Taiwan.  The issue is that – as with mobilization – choosing to activate ships and aircraft is impossible to conceal.  China is heavily involved in overseas trade.  It’s economy depends on it.  China cannot feed its people without considerable imports, and this also applies to raw materials and particularly oil.  To pull significant numbers of ships out of service would massively disrupt the Chinese economy, and might lead to food shortages.  Similarly, airline traffic would experience major disruptions if aircraft were pulled out of service.

There is a reason why China has created dual use fleets and putting them in military status would be a key indicator that invasion preparations were underway.

Garrisons in Garrison

It is important to remember that the PLA is not loyal to China, but to the Chinese Communist Party. Its central mission is not the defense of the Chinese people but of maintaining the CCP’s rule.

For that reason, it is divided into separate geographic military commands which are stationed to maintain internal control. American units, by contrast, tend to be based in out of the way locations where they can train without disturbing major population centers. Many states actually have no active duty military bases and the only military units present are National Guard or Reservists. The later are federal forces, but the former are under the command of their state’s governor until they are called to federal duty.

Indeed, the United States also has laws limiting the ability of federal military forces to be used to quell civil unrest. China of course does not.

What this means is that amassing sufficient combat power to invade Taiwan would require rebalancing these garrisons and – more importantly – concentrating many of them under a single unified command.

This poses a serious threat to China’s leadership because whoever is in command, might lead a coup. This is what actually happened in 1911 when the Qing dynasty called its leading general out of retirement, gave him command of the military to put down widespread rebellions, and was promptly deposed.

Having troops on the move is therefore highly problematic since ambitious commanders (many of whom are part of known social cliques) might make arrangements for mutual support. Such self-dealing is common in China, which has legendary levels of corruption. This is because – like all Communist states – promises are made to be broken. Honesty has no inherent value under Communism, and so if an ambitious officer sees and opportunity to gain power, there is no reason not to take it.

To prevent such a threat to the CCP, the PLA is ruled by committee – the Central Military Committee, to be precise. The chairman of this seven-member panel is President Xi Jinping, but every other member save one has been removed for corruption over the years.

This in theory consolidates Xi’s power, but it also disabled the legitimate command authority, further undermining the legitimacy of the regime.

All of which is to say, bringing the necessary forces to bear on the coast opposite Taiwan is going to create a major stir in China. The regional nature of the divided commands has also had the side effect of creating cliques based on those commands, which can lead to rival factions jockeying for position.

These cliques would naturally champion local CCP leaders, some of whom might imagine themselves succeeding Xi.

There is also the difficulty that moving forces out of certain areas might cause dissidents to see an opportunity to force a showdown with local officials, whose local police might be overwhelmed. There is a great deal of dissatisfaction with conditions in China, which is another reason why units are so spread out. They are occupation troops maintaining the ancient Chinese Empire.

Especially in regions far from Beijing, reducing those garrisons might cause provinces to think they could break away – or at least gain political concessions.

The upshot is that unlike Western societies, where shifting troops here and there is common for training or overseas rotations, in China everyone knows it could be the precursor to revoluion.