There is a lot of talk at the moment about the various definitions of victory and defeat in the context of Iran, and while I do not wish to engage on that particular topic, I think some background can help provide a more informed perspective.
Back in December I talked about how almost all modern pundits and politicians get the Munich Crisis of 1938 wrong.
While it was a diplomatic humiliation, the collapse of resistance to German expansionism into Czechoslovakia (which culminated with it subsequent annexation in early 1939) provided Nazi Germany with a vast trove of advanced weapons, especially tanks and artillery, but also vast quantities of small arms and ammunition. To be sure, Germany was an industrial powerhouse, famed for its arms industry, but Czechoslovakia had once been the industrial heart of Austria-Hungary, and key hub for its arsenal system.
I mention this because after the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had been almost totally disarmed. Yes, there was rampant cheating and evasion, dual-use facilities proliferated and detailed plans were put in motion to ensure a speedy return to full production, but that still faced the constraint of physics: you can only produce so much stuff at once.
Military production is an industrial process – one cannot just throw a bunch of resources at something to fix problem like play money a game of Axis and Allies. To ramp up production, new buildings need to be build, new tooling produced, workers trained, power stations built, and this process takes a great deal of time and effort.
One of the key advantages of the American style of wartime production in WW II, was that military planners consulted civilian industries when selecting arms, tanks and aircraft for adoption. A key consideration was whether existing plants could be quickly converted or whether entirely new facilities would have to be made. The stratospheric production numbers achieved were because the designs were suited to the factories, not the other way around.
Even with Germany’s immense industrial potential, simultaneous rebuilding land, air and sea power was beyond its capacity, and it took years to even come close. Not only that, but with each conquest, Germany gained control of new weapons plants, some of which were converted, and some which required no conversion at all. These (and their captive workers) acted as force multipliers, and yet still Germany never had enough of what it needed.
Now imagine an underdeveloped nation with only modest industrial capacity that is dependent on oil exports for the bulk of its economy. Imagine that their entire air force and navy have both been destroyed, and that their air defenses are completely ineffective. Not only that, the facilities that made missile components and drones are also piles of rubble.
This is a weakness that will take years if not decades to recover from. Global arms production is finite, and severely constrained at the moment. China has some export capability, but it is limited by its ongoing buildup against Taiwan and now Japan.
Russia has no capacity to spare. Western nations are enervated and uninterested in sales to an enemy. Where then will new armaments come from?
The answer is: nowhere. This is not like the old clashes with Hezbollah or Hamas and Israel. Both adversaries drew heavily on Iranian capacity to rebuild their stockpiles of rockets. Those factories are currently smoking holes in the ground.
Further adding to the absurdity of the discussion are the various critics insisting that American weapon stocks have been critically depleted, making the campaign a strategic defeat. This is nonsense on stilts. American factories are intact and efforts are currently underway to streamline and accelerate production.
In any other context, a nation whose fleet and air power were completely wrecked would be regarded as having suffered a major defeat, and one that lost virtually all munitions manufacturing would be regarded as catastrophic.
Weapons production are major themes in both Walls of Men and Long Live Death, and while production curves can put most people to sleep, they often make the difference between victory and defeat. A flat production curve is the worst of all.
Just something to keep in mind as the talking heads chatter away.
Chateau Lloyd 
Leave a comment